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Private Returns and Social Equity in the Financing of Higher Education* 
GARY S. FIELDS 
Yale University 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 A widespread phenomenon in developing countries has been the rapid growth of schools and institutions of higher 
learning resulting in a so-called ‘education explosion’. One possible explanation for the education explosion is that 
education is a profitable personal investment, as evidenced by high private rates of return. The high private returns are 
translated into demands on politicians for additional schooling spaces. To gain or maintain public favour, each politician 
uses his influence to try to increase the number of schools in his constituency. By this chain of events, growth of 
educational systems might be anticipated as long as private rates of return remain high. This would add to the already 
high fiscal burden of providing education and might prove to be a drain on the resources of the governments of many less 
developed countries. 
 In a recent paper Rogers calculates private rates of return to investment in post-secondary schooling based on 
1966 Government salary scales and 1968 cost figures.1  Three recent developments—large salary increases for Civil 
Servants with post-secondary schooling, growing unemployment and underemployment of secondary school leavers, and 
a decline in the average cost of higher levels of schooling— combine to raise substantially the private rates of return of 
higher levels of schooling. The purpose of this article is to analyze the effects of these changes on the private rates of 
return of higher levels of schooling and to assess the fiscal and equity implications of alternative loan programmes. The 
higher levels of education considered here are university, secondary teacher training, primary teacher training and higher 
secondary education. 
 The limitations should be clearly stated at the beginning. First, consideration is of necessity limited to the private 
returns of education. This is not to say that social rates of return are not of interest. Rather, the data needed to construct 
estimates of marginal social benefits— including aggregate production functions for the farm and non-farm sectors and 
demand for labour relationships by educational category— are simply not available for Kenya. Secondly, this paper relies 
on Government salary scales for the determination of private benefit streams. Since the overwhelming majority of 
students with post-secondary schooling are employed by the Government, the bias introduced by this procedure is likely 
to be relatively limited. However, since a much smaller percentage of persons with primary or secondary schooling are 
employed in the public sector and since there are reliable data from a household survey on the earnings and 
unemployment of these persons, a third limitation of this paper is that it is confined to consideration of returns to 
investment in post-secondary schooling. 
 
 
CHANGES SINCE 1966 
 The average private rates of return to investment in different levels of higher education are found by solving 
 
by iteration for r, where r is the internal rate of return, B1 and C1 are the expected benefits and costs in year i, and T is the 
time of retirement. The present is taken as time zero. It is assumed that students complete Form IV at age 19 and that 
retirement occurs at age 55. C1 includes out-of-pocket costs plus expected earnings foregone while in school, allowing for 
unemployment of secondary school leavers. B1 is the increment to income in year i due to education. It is the difference 
between expected income (allowing for unemployment) of persons with the higher level of schooling as compared with 
persons with the lower level. It is assumed somewhat arbitrarily that the entire salary differential is attributable to 
education alone.2 Let us now look at the changes in salaries, unemployment rates, and costs since 1966. 
1. Salaries 
 As a result of a detailed inquiry by the Ndegwa Commission into the terms and conditions of employment in the 
public service, a new public service salary schedule was put into effect as of 1 July 1971. (See Table 8.1.) Secondary school 
leavers received minimal pay increases. Teachers received moderate increases. Very large increases, on the order of 50 
per cent, were granted to university graduates to try to attract more to Government service. 
2. Unemployment 
 There seems to be little if any unemployment amongst persons with post-secondary education. Except for brief 
periods of frictional unemployment we may safely assume that university graduates, trained teachers, and Form V and VI 
leavers are and have until now been fully-employed. However, as the chapter by Kinyanjui makes clear, unemployment 
among secondary school leavers became a problem in 1968 and it is believed that the situation has worsened since then.  
 
 
 The combined effect of the wider salary differentials and growing unemployment of secondary school leavers is 
to increase the gap between expected lifetime earnings of university graduates and secondary school leavers. The ratio of 
undiscounted expected lifetime earnings of university graduates relative to secondary school leavers rose from 2.1 in 1966 
to 2.9 in 1971.3 The demand for university education would be expected to increase even further beyond capacity as 
young people respond to the enlarged income differentials. 
3. Costs 
 Under the existing system of financing higher levels of education in Kenya, all students at the teacher training 
colleges and most students at the University of Nairobi receive tuition, books, room and board, a clothing allowance, plus 
a small cash maintenance allowance. No fees are charged in Forms V and VI in the Government-maintained secondary 
schools. In the higher-cost Government-assisted secondary schools, each student receives a standard bursary of 450 
shillings (£22.5) per year, but he may get more according to his parents’ financial status. These fee policies are justified on 
the basis of selectivity— that those who qualify for higher education should not be discouraged by high fees. These 
policies, which determine the private out-of-pocket costs of higher levels of schooling, have been in effect without change 
since independence in 1963.** 
 To consider the private rates of return that would prevail under alternative loan schemes, we need to know the 
average budgetary cost of different levels of schooling. Table 8.2 (p. 191) shows that the average annual costs4 of all types 
of higher education fell between 1968 and 1971. In the case of the University of Nairobi and the main secondary teachers’ 
colleges this is the result of a rapid expansion of enrolments. With regard to the primary teachers’ colleges, the 
Government is expanding some of the colleges while reducing the overall number. 
4. The Effect on Rates of Return 
The combined effect of the changes described in Sections 1 to 3 is of course to increase the private rates of return to 
investment in higher levels of education. Table 8.3 (p. 194) compares my calculations of internal private rates of return 
using 1971 data with Rogers’ calculations based on earlier data. Columns la and Ib show the rates of return earned under 
the existing system of financing post-secondary education based respectively on 1966 and 1971 salaries and costs. The 
private rates of return to higher education under the existing full-subsidy system in Kenya are very high compared to rates 
earned in such countries as the U.S.5 and U.K.6 and in other countries.7 The populace is well aware of the large private 
benefits received by the fortunate few who are able to continue their education beyond the secondary level. Even if a 
university graduate is unemployed 10 per cent of the time, the expected private rate of return is still about 28 per cent. 
Consequently, the demand for education is strong and persistent. 
 We note that consideration of promotion prospects has only a trivial effect on the rate of return to university 
education. 
 ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES FOR FINANCING HIGHER LEVELS OF SCHOOLING 
 The recent literature on the economics of education includes several proposals for educational finance which 
would help relieve the fiscal burden on governments. Calculations of the private rates of return to investment in higher 
levels of education in Kenya under three of these schemes are presented in Table 8.3, which compares results for 1966 
and 1971. 
 Columns IIa and IIb compare the old and new rates of return under a pay-as-you-go system. Under this scheme, 
the student would pay the full costs of his education at the time he attends school. 
 Under the fixed-amount-payments scheme in columns IIIa and IIIb, the student would repay the total costs of his 
schooling without interest in fixed amount payments over his working life.8 
 Columns IVa and IVb present the returns under a percentage-of- earnings scheme. Under this plan, the student 
would repay a fixed percentage of his income such that if he earns the public service salary, the undiscounted value of his 
payments would just cover the costs of his schooling.9 Graduates in higher-paying occupations would pay more than the 
average cost, those in low-paying occupations less.  
 Under any of the alternative financing schemes discussed above, the rates of return would remain high. The 
returns fall by only a couple of points under the fixed-amount-payment scheme and the percentage- of-earnings scheme. 
Even under the much more stringent pay-as-you-go plan, returns range from 15 per cent to 23 per cent, still a highly 
profitable personal investment. 
A POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
 An educational finance policy should ideally be formulated simultaneously with the decision on the number of 
places offered at the different levels of schooling and in the context of an overall economic plan. Such an exercise is clearly 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, if we sub-optimize and take the size of the existing higher education system as 
given, we may ask how the proposed scheme for financing higher levels of education might help achieve national 
objectives. 
 Kenya’s national goals are clearly stated in the Development Plan. While the Plan includes such goals as 
minimization of unemployment, greater relevance of the secondary curriculum, and progress toward free and universal 
primary education; economic growth and greater equity in the distribution of income received special emphasis. The 
central importance of the equity objective may be seen from the following quotation from the Plan: 
A fundamental objective of the Government... is to secure a just distribution of the national income. . . . There are at present 
inequalities of income between a small number of highly remunerated individuals on the one hand—large farmers, people in 
business, politics, the civil service, and certain professions— and the great mass of the people on the other. ... It will, however, 
continue to be the policy of the Government to ensure that the higher income groups in the population contribute 
increasingly, by way of taxation, towards the objective of reducing the income gap between rich and poor to a socially 
acceptable level within a reasonable period of time.10 
 Given the importance of the national objective of a more equitable distribution of income, either the fixed-
amount-payment scheme (columns III of Table 8.3) or the percentage-of-earnings scheme (columns IV) would be 
preferable to the existing full-subsidy scheme. However, neither of these loan schemes charges students the full costs of 
their schooling, since interest charges are omitted. This is undefensible on equity grounds, since the greater the reliance 
on tax revenues to finance education and the less the reliance on tuition charges, the greater the transfer of income from 
poor to rich. 
 A more equitable distribution of income would be realized if Kenya were to finance its higher education system 
by means of a compulsory full-cost loan programme on a percentage-of-income basis. Such a full-cost policy would charge 
students all schooling costs including interest on their loans. A person earning at the public service salary scale would be 
liable for a fixed percentage of his income over his working lifetime11 that would just repay the average cost of his 
schooling. Assuming a 5 per cent rate of interest, under the new salary schedule, university graduates would need to pay 
10.6 per cent of their earnings, Si teachers 4.3 per cent, Pi teachers 2.5 per cent, and Form VI leavers 1.1 per cent. This 
would roughly double the direct tax burden of each group. As with other fixed percentage-of-income plans, the higher an 
individual’s income, the greater the sum to be repaid. 
 Since the graduate would be required to repay full costs including interest, the total amount to be repaid would 
be equal in present value to the outlays under the pay-as-you-go plan. Thus, the rates of return earned under the proposed 
full-cost percentage-of-income plan are those given in column lib of Table 8.3112 The fact that these rates are markedly 
lower than the rates under other loan programmes should reduce the demand for education somewhat. However, since 
the rates of return would still be quite high, demand would remain strong, particularly amongst the more able students 
who judge themselves likeliest to succeed. Provided the scheme is clearly explained and actively promoted by national 
leaders and school guidance counselors, it is likely that few highly-qualified students would be discouraged from 
continuing with higher education. 
 Economic growth is likely to be enhanced by the introduction of the proposed full-cost percentage-of-income loan 
scheme. At first, the proposed scheme would yield little. But in the longer run, repayment of loans (largely out of 
consumption, presumably) would add substantially to Government’s revenues with no corresponding increase in 
expenditures required. Given the crucial importance of taxes as a source for national savings and investment and the high 
opportunity cost of existing items in the Government budget, we would expect that the additional revenues would be 
invested in important and socially profitable public projects, resulting in more rapid economic growth.  
 
  
  To summarize these points and mention some additional considerations, the recommended plan would be 
expected to have advantages over the existing full-subsidy system: 
(a) Less redistribution of income from poor to rich and from taxpayers to graduates and their families; 
(b) More rapid economic growth in the longer run; 
(c) Lower private rates of return to investment in education and thus less demand for education and less 
 pressure on the educational system at all levels to expand; 
(d) More serious and committed students and workers who are aware of the debt owed their government; 
(e) An incentive for students to seek greater efficiency in the schools, since lower average costs would result 
 in lower repayment rates. It would also have advantages over a fixed-amount loan scheme: 
(f) No disincentive effect on those who might choose to enter low- paying but worthy occupations; 
(g) A pooling of risks, so that the individual is not liable for a fixed amount in the event of personal disaster; 
(h) Constancy of payment in real terms (an advantage to the Government). 
 If a loan programme is politically feasible, I see no reason why the inclusion of interest charges would not also be. 
The initial unpopularity is unquestionable, particularly among current or prospective recipients of higher education, whose 
tax burdens would as much as double. But public support might well be enlisted if the people are informed that 
implementation of the proposed scheme would free budgetary resources which, in the absence of other financial 
constraints, would allow primary school fees to be eliminated. Alternatively, Kenya would educate 300,000 more primary 
students a year or have 2,000 new hospital beds or 4,000 kilometres of new roads. Yet higher education would continue 
to be a highly lucrative and rewarding personal investment. The charges and payments could readily be administered by 
the Tax Department, particularly if the tax system is streamlined to alleviate the double income taxation which now exists. 
 Another possibility is to finance higher education (and Government in general) by means of a more steeply 
progressive tax structure. This has strong appeal on a number of grounds: 
(a) The requisite tax increase per taxpayer would be substantially smaller than the doubling which graduates 
 would have to pay under the full-cost percentage-of-income loan scheme. Less political opposition might 
 therefore be expected. 
(b) All high income persons, regardless of where or when they were educated, would pay the costs. There 
 would be no sharp division between graduates who received higher education prior to introduction of a 
 loan scheme and those educated subsequently, or between those educated abroad at the expense of 
 foreign governments or institutions. 
(c) It would be easier to administer, since uniform rates would apply to everyone. As part of an incomes policy 
 of lowering wage differentials (and therefore private rates of return and demand for education) and 
 redistributing income, an increase of income tax rates in the upper brackets has much to commend itself. 
 But in a world of extremely high private rates of return, income redistribution in favour of the rich through 
 the educational system and runaway growth of secondary schooling, a loan policy would contribute sub-
 stantially to alleviating the grosser inequities. Perhaps, a combination, such as exists in Tanzania, of loans 
 for higher education along with an incomes policy and more steeply progressive taxation would contribute  
 
* I wish to thank Peter S. Heller and Richard C. Porter for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. 
 
** Editors ‘note:  
 Since this article was written the Government has decided to introduce a loan programme to cover 
student maintenance  costs at the University. The minimum size of the loan p.a. will be £300. It will be made 
on concessionary terms with a  nominal service charge and will be repayable within a period of fifteen 
years from the commencement of studies. 
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